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ABSTRACT
23
 
The mobile penetration rate in Taiwan has climbed from 6.86 to 112.15 mobile phone 
accounts per 100 capita in the first six years of market competition, during which the 
state-owned incumbent Chunghua Telecom was dethroned by a new entrant, Taiwan 
Cellular Corp. This paper addresses the cause of Taiwan’s unprecedented mobile 
growth, and provides policy solutions for countries that strive to improve their 
telecommunications sectors in a short time. The authors highlight the fundamental role 
of asymmetric regulation, rather than pure liberalization, in the creation of the 
deregulated telecommunications industry in Taiwan. The asymmetric regulation in 
Taiwan is manifested in a twofold framework: the dominant carrier versus competitors, 
and the fixed-line carrier versus mobile companies. An econometric analysis 
concludes that dualistic asymmetric regulation leads to higher growth for mobile 
competitors and raises the total mobile penetration rate. However, the authors warn 
against the paradoxical consequences of dualistic asymmetric regulation. The 
regulatory benefits which mobile entrants received evolved into rents when they 
successfully lobbied to end the follow-me call service, the pricing scheme of which 
contradicts the asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint. The paper calls for a sunset 
clause for dualistic asymmetric regulation in order to take full advantage of its 
strengths, while at the same time preventing rent-seeking by the firms which benefit. 
                                                          
23 This paper is rewritten from Chou & Liu (2006) 
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INTRODUCTION: ON THE WAVE OF THE WIRELESS SOCIETY 
 
Driven by the policy goal of building Taiwan as the Asia-Pacific 
Telecommunications Hub and obtaining WTO membership, the Taiwan 
government passed three telecommunications reform acts since the early 
1990s in order to restructure the market. Together these acts established a 
liberalization framework by introducing private competition, the separation of 
the public telecommunications operator from the regulatory regime, and the 
categorization of telecommunications services. In early 1997, eight mobile 
licenses were awarded to six out of twenty-two enterprises via a beauty 
contest. In each region, four new entrants competed with the state-owned 
incumbent—Chunghua Telecom—for a share of its market24. 
Within only six years of opening the market, mobile subscription in Taiwan 
has escalated from 6.86 percent to 112.15 percent25 (as of September 
2003). An additional 20 million users signed up for the service, and the 
number of mobile subscribers has grown 16.02 times. The unmet demand for 
mobile telephony before 1998—a waiting list of over one million—has 
vanished entirely. Meanwhile, Chunghua Telecom’s market share 
plummeted to about 30 percent. The leader status of Chunghua Telecom has 
been snatched away by a private entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp, which now 
holds a stable 30 percent market share, equivalent to 9 million subscribers. 
Table 1 summarizes the development of mobile communications in Taiwan. 
                                                          
24 Among the eight, two nationwide licenses went to Taiwan Cellular Corp and 
FarEastTone, and six regional licenses went to KG Telecom, Tuntex, TransAsia, 
MobiTai, Taiwan Cellular Corp, and FarEastTone. The licenses are ratified with the 
standard of the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM). Nationwide 
operators use the 1900 GSM standard, while regional operators deploy the 900 GSM 
standard. 
25 A percentage over 100 means that some users have more than one mobile 
account 
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Mobile 
Subscribers 
Penetration 
Rate 
(subscribers/p
er hundred 
persons) 
Market Share 
of Entrants 
Market Share 
of the 
Incumbent 
Dec. 2005 19,876,128 86.93 60.45% 39.55% 
Dec. 2004 21,527,933 94.88 61.95% 38.05% 
Dec. 2003 25,089,644 110.99 67.60% 32.40% 
Dec. 2002 23,905,409 106.15 71.87% 28.13% 
Dec. 2001 21,632,980 96.55 73.80% 26.20% 
Dec. 2000 17,874,000 80.24 73.90% 26.10% 
Dec. 1999 11,541,139 52.24 69.85% 30.15% 
Dec. 1998 4,727,045 21.56 53.89% 46.11% 
Dec. 1997 1,492,000 6.86 0.00% 100.00% 
Source: DGT <http://www.dgt.gov.tw/Chinese/Data-statistics/11.3/graph3.shtml>  
Table 1. Mobile Communications in Taiwan 
It has been said that the liberalization policy implemented by the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication (MOTC) and Directorate General of 
Telecommunications (DGT) constitutes a breathtaking development (Chou, 
2000:35)26. An examination of liberalization precedents worldwide finds that 
Taiwan’s experience is exceptional. Among the countries that have 
undergone telecommunications reforms, none of them has ever achieved so 
high a mobile penetration rate or reversed the dominant status of the 
incumbent in such a short time.  
This paper addresses the “real” cause behind the unprecedented mobile 
development in Taiwan, and discusses feasible solutions for other countries 
planning to improve their telecommunications in a short time. The 
asymmetric features inherent in Taiwan’s communications regulations are 
highlighted for the first time, and based upon a perspective of 
                                                          
26 National Communications Commission was inaugurated in January 2006 to 
incorporate two separate regulatory administrations on telecommunications, DGT, and 
on broadcasting/TV, Government Information Office (GIO), into one independent 
agency that regulates information and communications businesses. All the 
commissioners must be nominated by the Prime Minister of the Executive Yuan, and 
confirmed by the Congress. 
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contractarianism and institutional economics, it is contended that this 
dualistic asymmetric regulation is in fact the key institutional component 
which fostered the growth in Taiwan’s mobile telephony. The 
telecommunications regulator places restraints, including price caps and 
interconnection mandates, on the dominant carrier alone, and yet gives 
mobile providers the authority to set their own tariffs and interconnection 
charges. This asymmetry in regulations allows fixed-line end users to be 
easily lured to switch to mobile services, as mobile companies set high tariffs 
for fixed-line-to-mobile communications. Subsequently, the traffic of mobile 
communications has surged, with revenues surpassing those of fixed-line 
telephony (DGT, 2003). 
The dualistic asymmetric regulation in Taiwan is thus a potential model for 
policymakers in other countries wishing to expand telecommunications. The 
question which remains is, should countries embrace this approach without 
reservation? In response, this paper investigates the paradoxical 
consequences which the dualistic asymmetric regulation brings about, and 
finds that the asymmetric regulation could entail rents for mobile competitors, 
even though it successfully grows mobile services. The rival competitors thus 
have incentive to secure these rents through uneconomic activities such as 
political lobbies or entangling lawsuits. 
DUALISTIC ASYMMETRIC REGULATION AND ITS POLICY IMPACT 
 
Diagram 1 portrays the twofold framework of the asymmetric regulation: 
dominant/non-dominant carrier27 and fixed-line/mobile service provider. The 
letters A, B, C, and D individually represent different types of 
telecommunications service providers (TSPs). Diagram 1 also shows six 
types of communications transmission and termination between A, B, C, and 
D. In 1997, the DGT declared Chunghua Telecom, the only fixed-line carrier 
thus far, to be the dominant carrier, and other mobile service providers to be 
non-dominant carriers. Accordingly, the dualistic framework of asymmetric 
regulation is manifested in Line 2 as Chunghua Telecom versus non-
dominant mobile firms. Compared with its counterparts, Chunghua Telecom 
                                                          
27 The term “dominant carrier” is defined by Article 5 of the “Administrative Regulation 
Governing Tariffs of Type I Telecommunications Enterprises” as a TSP that meets any 
of the following criteria: 
having control over essential facilities, or 
having dominant market power over prices, or  
having subscribers or turnover that account for at least 25 percent in the relevant 
market. 
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bears excessive regulatory oversight from the DGT. The asymmetric 
constraints on the dominant carrier and on the fixed-line service provider are 
respectively analyzed as follows. 
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Diagram 1. Dualistic Asymmetric Regulation in Taiwan 
• A: the fixed-line operator with the dominant status;
• B: the non-dominant fixed-line operator;
• C: the mobile company with the dominant status; and
• D: the non-dominant mobile firm.
• Line 1: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and C;
• Line 2: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and D;
• Line 3: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between C and D;
• Line 4: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and B;
• Line 5: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between B and C; and
• Line 6: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between B and D;
• Notice: Three new fixed-line licenses were awarded on March 19, 2000 and these non-
dominant firms started local service in April 2001. 
• A: the fixed-line operator with the dominant status;
• B: the non-dominant fixed-line operator;
• C: the mobile company with the dominant status; and
• D: the non-dominant mobile firm.
• Line 1: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and C;
• Line 2: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and D;
• Line 3: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between C and D;
• Line 4: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and B;
• Line 5: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between B and C; and
• Line 6: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between B and D;
• Notice: Three new fixed-line licenses were awarded on March 19, 2000 and these non-
dominant firms started local service in April 2001. 
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Asymmetric Constraints on the Dominant Carrier 
Article 26.1 of the Telecommunications Act (1999) forbids the dominant 
carrier from refusing interconnection and abusing its market power. The 
dominant carrier is obligated to disclose certain cost information, sell 
bottleneck services, and provide unbundled access to its network (Liu, 
2001).28 29 Article 9 of the “Administrative Regulation Governing Tariffs of 
Type I Telecommunications Enterprises” promulgates that the dominant 
carrier must set its tariffs based on the price caps approved by the DGT. 
As is well known, unbundled access may deprive the incumbent of 
economies of scope and scale while providing cost savings to its rivals. Total 
element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) pricing, which charges 
unbundled elements at long-run marginal costs, does not compensate for the 
incumbent’s opportunity costs of providing such access (Brock & Katz, 
1997:114-5). Sidak and Spulber also argue that unbundled access infringes 
upon the incumbent’s property rights as protected by the Constitution 
(1998:34). In addition, asymmetric disclosure of cost information empowers 
rivals in competing against the dominant carrier, as they can behave 
strategically by setting prices slightly below the incumbent’s (Besen & Farrell, 
1994:127). Our previous study demonstrates that the mandate of symmetric 
information disclosure otherwise deflates the market values of competitive 
rivals as they are unable to engage in strategic behaviours (Chou, 1999:304-
5). As far as price caps are concerned, they function closer to the 
requirement of information disclosure in a competitive market. Such 
regulation enables rival competitors to obtain information regarding the 
incumbent’s tariff schemes at reduced costs and to strategically price their 
services. Admittedly, market entrants prefer asymmetric constraints on the 
dominant carrier so that they can realize a competitive advantage in 
capturing market share. 
                                                          
28 Article 26.1 states that a designated dominant carrier is prohibited from: refusing, 
directly or indirectly, interconnection requested by other facility-based TSPs by reason 
of proprietary technology; refusing to disclose information to other facility-based TSPs 
regarding the measurements of interconnection charges and relevant costs thereof; 
improperly determining, maintaining, or altering the prices charged for 
telecommunications services; refusing, without due cause, access to network elements 
requested by other facility-based TSPs; rejecting, without due cause, the lease 
requests of transmission circuits made by TSPs or subscribers; rejecting, without due 
cause, testing requests made by TSPs or subscribers; and, abusing market power or 
engaging in unfair competition. 
29 This provision corresponds to Article 10 of the Fair Trade Law that prohibits anti-
competitive conduct by the dominant carrier. 
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Asymmetric Restrictions on the Fixed-line Service Provider 
The determining feature of the dualistic asymmetric regulation lies in the 
restriction on the fixed-line operator. This regulation distinguishes Taiwan 
from all other regulatory governances worldwide. In the DGT’s view, the 
fixed-line network is the basic infrastructure over which long-distance, 
international, and mobile services are originated, transmitted, or terminated. 
Like long-distance and international services, mobile communications are 
treated as the downstream service of local telephony. As the “access charge” 
model is used for revenue allocation between upstream and downstream 
services, the DGT applied the same rule to mobile communications 
generated from Chunghua Telecom’s fixed-line network.  
Article 19 of “The Administrative Rules for Network Interconnection Between 
Type I Telecommunications Carriers” stipulates that: Except for international 
communications, ownership of tariffs for communications between mobile 
communications networks and fixed-line communications networks shall be 
governed by the following principles: 
• Tariffs shall be collected by the call-originating telecommunications 
carrier from its subscribers pursuant to the tariff schedules set by 
mobile communications network carriers, and the revenue from 
tariffs shall go to the mobile communications network carriers; and 
• Bad debts shall be assumed by the call-originating 
telecommunications carrier and such carrier shall not be relieved of 
its responsibility to pay relevant charges to the call-terminating 
telecommunications carriers. 
While the calling party pays all the communications charges, Article 19 
delegates to mobile firms the pricing authority over all outgoing and incoming 
mobile services, and allocates such revenues to them. Under this pricing 
scheme, Chunghua Telecom cannot retain the revenues of the outgoing 
mobile communications originated from its fixed-line network but is mandated 
to collect the charges on behalf of the mobile firms.  
Chunghua Telecom is then paid access charges by the mobile firms for 
transmitting calls to their mobile networks. Since the establishment of the 
asymmetric revenue-sharing scheme between mobile and fixed-line 
communications, the mobile market has grown very quickly, while local 
telephony has experienced stagnant growth (see Diagram 2). Indeed, the 
growth of both types of communications is interdependent, as they entail 
substantial effects of substitution for each other (Kelly, 1996:11).30 Table 2 
                                                          
30 Mobile substitution takes place at the level of (1) marginal choice over a second 
fixed-line telephone and (2) replacement of fixed-line telephony (Kelly, 1996:11). 
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delineates four calling patterns between fixed-line and mobile 
communications. Chunghua Telecom can only set the tariff of the calling 
pattern A (fixed-line-to-fixed-line communications), while the pricing authority 
of the other three goes to mobile firms. Chunghua Telecom under this 
asymmetric revenue-sharing scheme retains only the revenues of Pattern A. 
Unlike in most countries, where Pattern B’s (mobile-to- fixed-line 
communications) tariff is set higher than C’s (fixed-line-to-mobile 
communications) due to a concern with universal service, those tariffs in 
Taiwan are identical. Because mobile firms collect the revenues of both 
Patterns B and C, they have no incentive to differentiate the tariffs.  
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Source: DGT statistics (http://www.dgt.gov.tw) 
Diagram 2. Mobile and Fixed-line Communications in Taiwan 
Supposing a consumer’s choice of mobile telephony is a function of the price 
and the quantity of outgoing and incoming calls (Shih, 2000:8-10), a higher 
tariff of Pattern C inevitably reduces the calling volume from the fixed-line 
network to mobile systems while multiplying the calls made from mobile 
networks. By setting a lower tariff for Pattern D (mobile-to-mobile 
communications) than C, mobile carriers further encourage the fixed-line 
users to migrate to mobile-to-mobile communications. Currently, the number 
of mobile subscribers has exceeded that of fixed-line telephony by ten million 
(DGT, 2003). When telephone users migrate from the calling pattern C to D, 
Chunghua Telecom hardly obtains any access charges from mobile service 
providers, and its expected revenues are seriously truncated. Accordingly, 
this asymmetric tariff scheme enables mobile firms to sign up customers 
more quickly and allows mobile-to-mobile service to prevail. While mobile 
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service providers have enjoyed extraordinarily high profits over the last five 
years, Chunghua Telecom is experiencing a decline in calls and traffic 
volume of local voice telephony. 
 
From 
To 
Fixed-line Network Mobile Network 
 
 
Fixed-line Network 
 
 
 
A 
(NT$0.34/min) 
 
 
B 
(NT$5.00/min) 
 
 
Mobile Network 
 
 
 
C 
(NT$5.60/min) 
 
 
D 
(NT$4.8/min) 
Source: http://www.dgt.gov.tw 
Table 2. Calling Patterns from Fixed-line to Mobile Communications 
When making a call terminated by the local exchange carrier, the caller will 
adopt either the calling pattern A or B, depending on availability of access to 
the local exchange network. When making a call terminated by mobile 
service providers, the caller will definitely choose Pattern D as long as 
he/she has mobile access. It is imperative to notice that Pattern A will not be 
replaced by B, because the former’s tariff is much cheaper than the latter’s. 
However, the calling pattern D is more likely to replace C if the latter’s tariff is 
more expensive than the former’s. 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DUALISTIC ASYMMETRIC REGULATION 
 
The authors run regression tests which are used to measure the impacts of 
the dualistic asymmetric regulation on mobile communications development, 
indicated by the mobile penetration rate and its growth rate. The fixed effects 
model runs an ordinary least square (OLS) estimation on two dummy policy 
variables—the asymmetric constraints on the dominant carrier and on the 
fixed-line carrier—and their interaction term. The regression analyses were 
performed on panel data designated by country and by year (1981 to 2002). 
Eight OECD countries with different mobile pricing schemes—Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, France, Germany, Portugal, Britain and the U.S.—are 
selected as the benchmark of regulatory governance. Among those 
countries, Portugal has a tariff regime similar to Taiwan’s, in which the fixed-
line operators retain only interconnection charges for their outbound traffic 
terminated at the mobile network. In contrast, France, Germany, and the UK 
set up the “caller pays” tariff scheme, in which outgoing traffic is charged by 
its originator and mobile firms retain only the revenues of their own outgoing 
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calls. Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the U.S. on the other hand have 
adopted the “both-ends-pay” (or “mobile party pays”) principle, in which 
mobile phone users pay for both outgoing and incoming calls but mobile 
firms are not authorized to set the tariff for fixed-line-to-mobile 
communications and do not own such revenues.  
As far as the asymmetric restraints on the incumbent are concerned, in 1993, 
the OFTEL of Hong Kong issued a price cap regulation on the dominant 
carrier, Hong Kong Telecom, until 2002. Japan did not impose restrictions on 
the incumbent, NTT, until 1998, although mobile services were provided 
early in 1981. Singapore has not yet considered asymmetric regulation since 
it opened its telecommunications market in 1996. France initiated 
asymmetric restrictions on the dominant carrier in 1995 but ended them in 
1998, and Germany began asymmetric regulation in 1993. Portugal followed 
the WTO basic telecommunications service agreement to adopt the 
dominant carrier restriction in 1998. The United Kingdom took the 
asymmetric regulation approach on BT since its privatization in 1984. And 
the US promulgated the price cap regulation against the Baby Bells and 
AT&T in 1989 and repealed it by the enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act in 1996.  
 
 
VARIABLES 
 
 
MOBILE SUBSCRIPTION 
PER CAPITA 
 
[A] 
PENETRATION RATE OF 
THE INCUMBENT 
 
[B] 
PENETRATION RATE OF 
THE COMPETITORS 
 
[C] 
MARKET OPENNESS 
(NO. OF FIRMS) 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
DOMINANT-CARRIER 
RESTRAINT 
 
 
   
REVENUE-SHARING 
CONSTRAINT 
 
  
 
 
INTERACTION EFFECT 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
OBSERVATIONS 
 
136 116 116 
X: the variable has a statistically significant and positive impact on the mobile penetration rate. 
Data source: ITU Telecommunication Indicators (2003); DGT statistics (http://www.dgt.gov.tw) 
 
 
Table 3. Regulatory Impact on the Mobile Penetration Rate 
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Table 3 presents the regression results for the mobile penetration rate, and 
Table 4 reports the results for the growth rate.31 Column A in Table 3 
validates the effectiveness of the dualistic asymmetric regulation on a 
country’s mobile penetration level. Neither the restraint on the incumbent nor 
that on the fixed-line operator can by itself generate significant impact; 
whereas, their interaction term (i.e., the dualistic asymmetric regulation) 
raises the penetration rate per capita. Likewise, Column C of Table 3 shows 
that this regulatory asymmetry increases the competitors’ subscription level 
per capita. However, neither of the dual regulatory asymmetries significantly 
causes the incumbent’s subscription level per head to plummet (see Column 
B in Table 3). That is, simultaneous introduction of both asymmetric 
restraints is confirmed to develop a country’s mobile communications, and 
seemingly, it does not accomplish this at the expense of its incumbent’s 
advances. 
The results in Table 4 then reveal the other part of the story. Although the 
dominant-carrier restraint and the implementation of the twofold asymmetric 
regulation do not affect the incumbent’s mobile penetration level, they do 
have significant and negative impacts on its growth pattern (see Column A of 
Table 4). In contrast, Column B in Table 4 demonstrates a much stronger 
impact on the development of the competitors’ mobile voice services. 
Simultaneous introduction of both asymmetric regulations increases the 
competitors’ growth rate.  
The regression results combined lead us to conclude that the implementation 
of the dualistic asymmetric regulation will foster rapid development in mobile 
communications in a short period of time. It allows us to recommend a policy 
solution for countries with underdeveloped telecommunications. They are 
advised to simultaneously implement the twofold asymmetric regulation in 
hopes of rapidly expanding mobile voice services in a short time. The 
question which remains is whether or not implementation of such dualistic 
asymmetric regulation is justified based on the outcome of rapid penetration 
in mobile communications. The findings in Table 4 affirm that, while the 
competitors gain from the twofold asymmetric regulation in the form of a 
boost in their subscription level, the incumbent’s ability to grow its customer 
base is devastated by the same regulatory framework. That is, the swift 
expansion of mobile communications is made possible at the expense of the 
incumbent’s growth. The next section explores the drawbacks which the 
asymmetric regulation entails. 
                                                          
31 The two proxy variables for the asymmetric regulation on the incumbent, caps and 
xcaps, produced similar and consistent findings, although the dummy one gave a 
slightly larger impact. This paper thus presented the regression results generated by 
the dummy variable caps. 
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Variables 
 
Growth rate of the 
incumbent’s mobile 
subscription 
 
 
[A] 
Growth rate of the 
competitors’ mobile 
subscription 
 
 
[B] 
Market Openness 
 
 
 
 
x 
Dominant-carrier restraint 
 
 
 
-x 
 
Revenue-sharing 
constraint 
 
  
Interaction effect 1 
 
 
 
-x 
 
x 
Mobile-party-pays 
principal 
 
 
 
 
Interaction effect 2 
 
 
 
-x 
 
Observations 
 
112 47 
X: the variable has a statistically significant and positive impact on the mobile growth rate. 
-X: the variable has a statistically significant and negative impact on the mobile growth rate. 
Data source: ITU Telecommunication Indicators (2003); DGT statistics (http://www.dgt.gov.tw). 
 
Table 4. Regulatory Impact on the Growth Rate of Mobile Communications 
SEEKING REGULATORY RENTS 
 
In the last decade, the contractarian approach has made itself a presence in 
policy analysis in response to the call for regulatory devolution and 
renovation. It views industrial regulation as a contract between the regulator 
and the regulated firm. Both parties ex ante specify the substantive terms 
and conditions of regulation and ex post implement and enforce the 
regulation (Moe, 1984:750). Indeed, each telecommunications operator has 
a unique incentive intensity concerning service provision. If the incentive 
scheme with which a policy alternative is associated corresponds to its 
incentive intensity, its opportunity costs are greatly reduced and its expected 
payoffs increase. Otherwise, the policy alternative will distort the firm’s 
incentive to undertake telecommunications. As evidenced by the above 
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analysis, the twofold asymmetric regulation in Taiwan increases the 
expected payoffs of mobile entrants by granting them the right to charge and 
collect tariffs of fixed-line-to-mobile communications, and as a result, they 
are more likely to make telecommunications investment. Since the 
promulgation of the regulation, mobile competitors have signed up 2.32 times 
more subscribers than Chunghua Telecom (DGT, 2003). Chunghua Telecom 
so far has lost nearly 70 percent of the mobile market to the entrants.  
From the contractarian point of view, the regulatory asymmetry enables the 
mobile entrants in Taiwan to reduce business risks and take advantage of 
the unequal terms of competition to behave opportunistically, since the 
incumbent is obligated to disclose all cost information and to provide full 
network access. The asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint even acts like a 
wealth transfer from Chunghua Telecom to the competitors. The mobile 
competitors are thus greatly better off in the asymmetric regulatory 
governance and they have strong incentives to preserve this governance.  
Policy scholars have long observed that interest group politics play an 
influential role in policy formation and implementation. Since policies 
inevitably allocate costs and benefits among regulated firms, the firms as 
interest groups will make efforts to direct the policy agenda toward their own 
benefits. The winners in the current regulatory regime desire to sustain 
influence over policymaking and deter policy changes that do not reward 
them. On the contrary, losers tend to expand the scope of conflict. By 
mobilizing countervailing forces, these firms struggle to redefine policy 
images and change policy agendas (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993:83-9). 
Accordingly, the telecommunications firm has incentive to invest in non-
economic activities, such as lobbies or public affairs, in exchange for 
regulations in their favour. 
However, such non-economic activities do not necessarily lead to socially 
desirable outcomes even if they benefit individual firms (Mbaku, 1998:195). 
Especially when the benefited firms successfully lobby against the 
deployment of new services or technologies, the regulatory benefits they 
receive evolve into rents, that is, abnormal profits. The economic output will 
decrease when the firms allocate resources towards rent seeking rather than 
production and innovation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998:81-9). Sidak and Spulber 
argue against regulations that encourage entry by subsidizing entrants or 
applying rules asymmetrically on incumbents because they may create the 
potential for uneconomic bypass. The entry would be uneconomic without 
subsidies or asymmetric regulation (1998:30). 
This dualistic asymmetric regulation places Taiwanese mobile entrants in an 
advantageous position to compete with Chunghua Telecom and, as is 
evidenced by the analysis, entails regulatory benefits for them. They 
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undoubtedly will engage in lobbies to preserve the benefits. The case of the 
follow-me call service (the 099 service) is then examined to illustrate how 
mobile entrants “lobbied against” a new service whose pricing scheme 
contradicts the dualistic asymmetric regulation. 
The 099 call service offered by Chunghua Telecom since 1999 allows 
consumers to be fully connected with only one number.32 Consumers’ utilities 
are indeed increased through its full access. When the 099 number is set on 
the consumer’s mobile phone, the traffic is terminated at the mobile system 
and the mobile service provider must grant Chunghua Telecom 
interconnection with its system. Chunghua Telecom’s original rate for the 099 
call service was $NT3.60 per minute and the company contributed an 
NT$2.00 access charge to the mobile firm for traffic termination. 
From the viewpoint of the mobile rival competitors, the allocation of the 
revenues of the 099 call service and access charges nonetheless infringes 
on their right to retain the revenues from all mobile communications. The 
mobile firm earns a net profit of about NT$5.00 per minute for the mobile 
service terminated over its network, while obtaining only an NT$2.00 access 
charge for the 099 call service. In addition, the 099 call service shares 
certain characteristic of a mobile service and yet costs less than mobile 
telephony, so that mobile subscribers are easily lured to the service. The 
mobile competitors were set to lose profits if the 099 call service became 
more popular. Therefore, mobile rivals lobbied the DGT to raise the tariff and 
the access charge on the 099 call service. The mandated high tariffs of the 
099 call service then led to a huge decline in subscription right after its debut. 
This case demonstrates that the regulated firms will invest in non-economic 
activities to deter service renovation that conflicts with their interests and to 
maintain their privileges induced by the status quo policy regime. 
CONCLUSION: PARADOXICAL IMPACT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
This paper examined the paradoxical impact which dualistic asymmetric 
regulation in Taiwan has had on telecommunications development. The 
empirical analysis allows us to recommend a policy solution for countries 
with underdeveloped telecommunications. Simultaneously implementing the 
                                                          
32 The 099 call service operates via setting up the 099 number either on the 
consumer’s home phone, office phone, or mobile phone. In such a case, the consumer 
can be reached anywhere. 
Competition and Regulation with Asymmetries in Mobile Markets 
 
 
82 
twofold asymmetric regulation will bring about rapid penetration in mobile 
communications. It is notable, however, that this prompt development of 
mobile communications is achieved at the expense of the incumbent’s 
growth. Designated as a competition safeguard, the asymmetric regulation 
entails policy benefits for mobile entrants, enabling them to earn a higher 
penetration rate and abnormal profits. These beneficiaries, through the 
lobbying venue, may then forestall value-added services whose pricing 
scheme infringes on the asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint. The 
regulatory gains may thus evolve into rents when the benefited firms lobby 
against a newly invented value-added service.  
The dualistic asymmetric regulation even creates disincentive for 
telecommunications firms to deploy fixed-line technologies and services, 
since the local exchange carrier is prohibited from setting and collecting 
tariffs for its outgoing traffic. As the fixed-line network involves specific 
assets, the firm is more likely to forego providing service if it is deprived of 
the opportunity to earn a fair return on this irreversible investment. The 
regulation therefore impedes competition in local telephony. In the long run, it 
may hinder telecommunications development since it distorts companies’ 
incentive to invest in local exchange service and directs their efforts to rent-
seeking activities. 
Policymakers must be alert about the rent-seeking behaviors by the rival 
competitors when promulgating the twofold asymmetric regulation in hopes 
of rapid growth in communications services. The present empirical analysis 
does imply that there should be an deactivating point for the regulation, such 
that it no longer applies once a certain point in market development (defined, 
for example, in terms of penetration rate) has been reached. It is suggested 
that policymakers insert such “sunset clauses” along these lines in dualistic 
asymmetric regulation in order to fully utilize its merits while avoiding rent-
seeking activities by the beneficiaries. However, the asymmetric revenue-
sharing constraint should not be repealed until after the mobile market has 
consolidated. Telecommunications officials must also refrain from arbitrary 
discretion when promulgating regulations on the dominant carrier in the 
competitive market. By following these recommendations, regulators could 
create policy credibility and mitigate business risks for the companies, thus 
creating an even playing field in which companies are equally affected by 
regulations and can thus focus on providing service and developing 
telecommunications in a way which maximizes public benefit. 
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